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THE CONFLICT TRAP REVISITED:  
 Civil Conflict and Educational Achievement 
Arzu KIBRIS 
Abstract 
This article analyzes the association between civil conflicts and educational achievement by 
studying the Turkish case. It combines the 2005 university entrance exam scores of more than 1.6  
million students, and a newly constructed data set on the casualties of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict 
to study the association between the conflict and educational achievement of Turkish students. The 
results reveal a significant negative association. Combined with the already well-established 
positive links between education and various measures of socioeconomic development like 
economic growth, social equality, and public health, the results in this article demonstrate that 
education is one of the channels through which civil conflicts damage the well-being of societies 
thereby creating the conditions that perpetuate them. 
 
Author’s Note: This study was partly conducted while I was visiting the Political Science 
Department of Duke University. I thank the members of this institution for their warm hospitality. I 
also thank Ahmet Alkan for sharing his amazing data set with me. And finally, I thank Michael 
Ward for all the helpful comments, and for his mentorship.  
Replication materials, and the online Appendix are available on http://jcr.sagepub.com/.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Civil conflicts perpetuate themselves by changing in certain ways the societies experiencing them. 
These conflicts pull societies into a “conflict trap” by destroying their economic development 
(Collier, 1999; Collier et al., 2003), by crippling their political institutions and rendering them 
unable to address the underlying grievances (Collier et al., 2003; Wood, 2008; Kibris, 2012), and by 
damaging the “life chances” of their civilian populations (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003; 
Ghobarah et al., 2003; Carlton-Ford and Boop, 2010). In this article, I argue that a significant part 
of this trap is created by the adverse effects of civil conflicts on education. I empirically study the 
effects of the civil conflict in Turkey on the educational achievement of Turkish high school 
students. The results reveal a significant negative impact, and thus, demonstrate an important 
mechanism through which civil conflicts exert long-term damage on the well-being of host 
societies. Moreover, combined with the well-established results in the literature on the positive 
association between education and socioeconomic development, and on the negative association 
between development and civil conflicts, these results show that education is an important channel 
through which civil conflicts perpetuate themselves.  
 This article is both a first to explore the effects of civil conflicts on educational 
achievement, and also a first to empirically analyze how the Kurdish-Turkish ethnic conflict that 
has been going on for 29 years affected education in Turkey. I combine two novel and interesting 
data sets to do so. The first data set consists of the test scores of more than 1.6 million students who 
took the Turkish university entrance exam (OSS) in 2005, along with information on the students’ 
gender, place of residency, and educational history including the highschools they had attended and 
the classes they had taken (Alkan et al., 2008).  
 The second data set is composed of the date and place of death of nearly 7000 Turkish 
security force casualties that the conflict claimed between 1984 and 2012. I develop a measure of 
the severity of the conflict based on the number of these casualties at the county level.  
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 Relying on these two data sets I study the impact of the conflict on the amount of learning  
high school students achieve which I measure by students’ test scores in the university entrance 
exam. I construct a multilevel linear model to study the association between the OSS scores of 
students and the severity of the armed conflict in their county during their schooling period while 
controlling for a large number of personal traits; for county level socioeconomic conditions; and 
also for possible unobserved school-specific, county-specific and province-specific factors. The 
results reveal a significant negative association between the armed conflict and the educational 
achievement of students. 
 In the following section, I look into the literature on the effects of armed conflicts on 
education, and into the literature on the association between education and socioeconomic well-
being of societies. In the third section, I present the Turkish case. In the fourth section, I present my 
models and introduce my variables. The fifth section discusses the data. I present my results in the 
sixth, and  finally, conclude in the seventh section.  
2. EDUCATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND CIVIL CONFLICT 
Civil conflicts are humanitarian disasters. And unfortunately, the immediate sufferings are only “the 
tip of the iceberg of their longer-term consequences for human misery” (Ghobarah et al., 2003). The 
adverse consequences of civil conflicts extend well beyond the period of active warfare. In their 
cross-national study, Ghobarah et al.(2003) empirically demonstrate the long term damaging effects 
of civil conflicts on public health. Guha-Sapir and van Panhuis (2002) demonstrate that mortality 
rates are higher after civil conflicts than they were before in host societies. Akresh et al. (2009) 
study the Rwandan case, and reveal the stunting effect the conflict has on the pyhsical development 
of children. Collier et al. (2003) analyze how the adverse effects of civil conflicts like increased 
military spending, capital flight, loss of social capital, and physical and mental public health 
deterioration continue even after the fighting is over.  Carlton-Ford and Boop (2010) sum these 
long-term adverse consequences as the negative impacts of civil conflicts on “life chances” by 
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which they mean the well-being of civilian populations and the development of human capabilities., 
and among which they include education. 
 The benefits of education to individuals and to society are well documented. Studies on the 
economic returns to educational attainment for individuals have uniformly shown that more 
schooling is associated with higher individual earnings (for excellent reviews of this literature see 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006; and Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2008). Education appears also to help achieve both greater social equality and greater 
equity in the distribution of economic resources (Lee, 2002; Hanushek, 2009). 
 Social benefits of education are argued to be even greater than the sum of its benefits to 
individuals (Hanushek, 2009). Following the classical contributions by Barro (1991, 1997) and 
Mankiw et al. (1992), a vast literature of cross-country growth regressions has found a significant 
positive association between level of and changes in educational attainment and economic growth 
(for detailed reviews of the literature see Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Sianesi and Van Reenen, 
2003).  
 Education is also argued to promote democracy both because it enables a “culture of 
democracy” to develop, and because it leads to greater prosperity, which is also thought to cause 
political development. The most celebrated version of this argument is the modernization theory, 
popularized by Lipset (1959). Empirical works, for example, by Barro (1999) and Przeworski et al. 
(2000), provide evidence consistent with this view. Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that differences in 
schooling are a major factor explaining not only differences in democracy but also in political 
institutions. Studies by Dee (2004) and Mulligan et al. (2004) demonstrate the positive association 
between educational attainment and voter participation, support for free speech, and the quality of 
civic knowledge. 
 Researchers have also investigated the association between education and other measures of 
social well-being and development. At the very basic level, a more educated society is likely to be 
more healthy (Evans et al. , 2000). Breierova and Duflo (2002) and Jamison et al. (2007) show the 
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dampening effect of education on child mortality rates. Currie and Moretti (2003) find a positive 
association between maternal education and infant health. Machin et al. (2010), and Lochner and 
Moretti (2003) present evidence that education is also is negatively related to criminal activity.  
 The positive association between education and socioeconomic well-being of societies 
implies that any factor hindering education in a society gives severe long-term damage to the 
development of the society in many respects. Civil conflicts are one such factor. Recent studies 
provide empirical evidence that civil conflicts are indeed negatively associated with educational 
attainment, school enrollment, and educational spending in host societies. Chamarbagwala and 
Moran (2011) demonstrate the strong negative impact of the Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war on 
the educational attainment of the most disadvantaged social and ethnic groups of the Guatemalan 
society. De Walque (2006) finds that the Cambodian genocide had a lasting impact on the 
educational attainment of the population.  Blattman and Annan (2010) find that young males who 
were recruited into armed groups in Uganda received less schooling, are less likely to have a skilled 
job, and more likely to earn lower wages. Merrouche evaluates the long run impact of Cambodia’s 
30 years of war on education levels and earnings. Akresh and De Walque (2008) study the impact of 
Rwandan genocide on children’s schooling and find a strong negative impact.  Lai and Thyne 
(2007) find that both educational spending and enrollment decline during periods of civil war. 
Poirier (2012) shows that periods of conflict have a strong positive impact on the number of 
children not attending school, and a strong negative impact on secondary school enrollment rates in 
Africa. Shemyakina (2011) finds that the civil war in Tajikistan had a dampening effect on 
educational attainment and school enrollment of girls. Singh and Shemyakina (2013) report a 
substantial negative effect of the Punjab insurgency on the educational attainment of girls. 
 These studies demostrate that one way civil conflicts “maim people long after the shooting 
stops” (Ghobarah et al., 2003) is by interrupting their education thereby preventing them from 
improving their human capabilities and fulfilling their potential. Relatedly, they also help us 
identify an important channel through which civil conflicts perpetuate themselves, and thus, provide 
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crucial information to governments about how to shape policies to block such dynamics more 
effectively. The positive association between education and individual earnings, economic growth, 
political development, democratization, political participation, support for human rights, public 
health measures, and social security and order as discussed above means that by hindering 
education civil conflicts hurt development in a society in many ways. And lack of development is  a 
key root cause of conflict (Collier et al., 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  Moreover, those 
populations whose educational opportunities are destroyed by the conflict find themselves trapped 
with no skills or tools to improve their socioeconomic and political situations, and consequently 
become potential recruits for further violence. It is in that sense no wonder that the people who join 
rebel organizations are overwhelmingly young, uneducated males (Collier et al., 2003; Blattman 
and Annan, 2010). In other words, what these studies reveal to us is a vicious cycle of conflict, a 
“conflict trap” (Collier et al., 2003) in which the conflict feeds the very own dynamics that are 
responsible for its onset in the first place.  
 Note that all the above studies on the asociation between civil conflicts and education as 
well as a great deal of those about the assocation between education and socioeconomic 
development focus on the same measure of education, namely, on the time amount of education 
host societies receive. However, there is now a growing consensus among scholars that quality of 
schooling is more important than quantity. Hanushek argues that quantity of schooling is actually a 
poor measure of the amount of learning that takes place in schools and that it is the amount of 
learning acquired in schools that determines the quality of the labor force in a society (Hanushek, 
2009). Measuring eduation through school attainment assumes a year in school in the United States 
is the same as a year in school in Afghanistan in terms of cognitive development of students. This 
assumption is very unlikely to hold. Scholars have dealt with this problem by employing 
standardized test scores of students as measures of educational quality, and achievement. These 
scores are argued to be a direct measure of the amount of learning that has taken place after a given 
number of years of schooling (Jamison et al., 2007; Hanushek et al., 2008). There is now 
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considerable evidence that compared to educational attainment, educational achievement measured 
by test scores is more significantly and directly related to measures of social and economic well-
being (Boissiere et al., 1985; Bishop, 1989; Lee and Lee, 1995; Barro, 1999; Mulligan, 1999; 
Murnane et al., 2000; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Barro, 2001; Lazear, 2003; Bosworth and 
Collins, 2003; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2005; Behrman et al., 2008; Hanushek and Zhang, 2009; 
Woessmann, 2003; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007, 2011; Jamison et al., 2007; Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2012).   
 In this article I employ a broader perspective on the possible impacts of civil conflicts on 
education. I argue that civil conflicts can hurt not only the educational attainment of host 
populations but also their educational achievement as well through their negative impact on the 
quality of education given, and the amount of learning achieved by students. Aside from their 
destructive impacts on infrastructure, and educational spending, civil conflicts also create security 
concerns, damage economic and social life, and consequently, make it very difficult for schools in 
the conflict zone to attract qualified, experienced teachers and/or keep them for long. Civil conflicts 
also disrupt daily life and make it difficult for teachers and students to follow the normal 
curriculum. They can also hurt students and teachers psychologically. The extraordinary conditions 
created by civil conflicts may also lead school administrations and teachers to loosen their standards 
for success. They may expect less from their students.  
 Note that such effects will not be detected by just analyzing educational attainment data. 
Students may still attend to and graduate from their schools even in the midst of a civil conflict, but 
it is highly likely that they will not be learning as much as they would under normal conditions in 
peaceful environments. As the literature I have discussed above demonstrates, such a negative 
impact of the conflict on educational achievement will then translate into further substantial damage 
on various important dimensions of social and economic well-being of the society including 
economic growth, democratization, social equality, and public health, and will aggrevate the 
societal grievances that are associated with the onset of the conflict in the first place.   
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3. THE TURKISH CASE 
Turkey has a centralized university entrance system. Each year in spring, a 3-hour, standardized, 
multiple choice test prepared by the Center of Student Assessment and Placement (OSYM), which 
is a state agency designated to conduct centralized evaluations of students, is administered to 
hundreds of thousands of students simultaneously all over the country. Those students who get high 
enough scores earn the chance to enroll in their preferred university programs. But unfortunately 
many students fail to do well in the test, and consequently part with their plans about university 
education. Because the test is centralized, standardized, and administered simultaneously to 
everyone who wants to have a university education, and because the curricula for primary and 
highschool education are also centrally determined by the ministry of education, the results are 
amenable to comparisons of educational quality and student learning across schools, and localities. 
 One very important aspect of the Turkish scene that needs to be considered in such a 
comparison is the civil conflict that has been going on in the country for the last three decades. 
Since late 1984, Turkey has been suffering from an insurgency campaign led by the Kurdish 
separatist guerilla organization Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan), the PKK. 
The organization was first founded with the goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in 
southeastern Turkey, though later on in the 1990s, it appeared to have rolled back on its goal to a 
federational structure that would grant more autonomy to the Kurdish population in Turkey. Armed 
activities of the PKK are almost completely concentrated in southeastern and eastern Turkey which 
is a poor, and underdeveloped part of the country, and which has traditionally been inhabited by 
ethnic Kurds. The conflict deepened further the economic and social disparity between the conflict 
zone and the rest of the country. The area has lost its economic and social appeal for business and 
people, and has come to be considered as exile by public employees like doctors and teachers who, 
by law are under a mandatory service requirement for a certain amount of time in locations chosen 
by the state.  
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 Financially, the conflict has cost the country billions of dollars. But more importantly, it has 
cost more than 40 thousand lives (Şener, 2010). Our knowledge about civilian and insurgent 
casualties is limited to aggregate numbers sporadically released by contending sources as there is no 
credible and publicly available dataset on them. Nevertheless, as part of this study, I constructed a 
unique database on security force (i.e. soldiers and police officers) casualties (SFCs).  
As can be clearly seen in Chart 1 above which depicts the total number of SFCs over the years, the 
90s has been the most bloody period of the conflict. The PKK received a major blow when its 
leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Africa in 1999, brought back to Turkey, tried and 
sentenced to life in prison. Headless and divided, the PKK ceased its attacks in the early 2000s. 
Unfortunately, peace in the area did not last long. The PKK resumed its attacks in 2004.  
 Chart 2 below depicts the geographical distribution of SFCs in the 1990-2005 period. The 
red areas show the counties with the highest number of SFCs (more than 500)i.  
Chart 2: Geographical Distribution of SFCs in the 1990-2005 period 
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4.THE DATA 
 In this study, I employ two novel data sets from Turkey to study the association between 
civil conflicts and educational achievement. The first one includes the scores and background 
information of 1,619,770 students who took the 2005 OSS exam. The data set is from the Center of 
Student Evaluation and Placement (OSYM). The exam includes 4 tests that students can take, 
namely science (physics, chemistry, biology); mathematics; Turkish language and literature; and 
humanities (philosophy, geography, history). Each student then gets three scores which are 
weighted averages of her/his scores from these four tests with different weights assigned to each. 
She/he gets a “quantitative” score which assigns the most weight to the science and mathematics 
tests; a “Turkish and math (TM)” score that assigns the most weight to the mathematics and the 
Turkish language and literature tests; and a “verbal” score that assigns the most weight to the 
humanities and the Turkish language and literature tests. University programs admit students based 
on one of these weighted scores depending on the subject of the program. Engineering programs, 
for example, admit students based on quantitative scores; economics programs admit students based 
on TM scores; history programs admit students based on verbal scores, etc.. Consequently, students 
focus on the tests that the programs they pursue require. Thus, in evaluating student performance in 
the OSS, I compare those students who focused on the same group of testsii.   
 Along with the quantitative, TM, and verbal scores, the OSS data set includes information 
on the gender of the student; the highschool she/he is about to graduate or has graduated from; 
her/his major in highschool; and her/his graduation status. Because I am interested in the 
association between students’ performance in the OSS and the level of violence in their localities 
during their schooling years, I limit the data set to students who are either about to graduate or have 
recently graduated from highschool, and are taking the exam for the first time which means those 
included in the analyses are students who were born around 1987, started school around 1993, and 
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were about 18 years old in 2005iii. I also exclude from the data set those students with missing data. 
These exclusions bring the number of observations to 1,353,339iv.  
 In order to measure the intensity of the conflict I refer to a casualty database that I 
constructed. This is a unique data set on the Turkish military and police force casualties (SFCs) that 
the Kurdish insurgency claimed since the beginning of armed attacks in 1984. The data set includes 
the date, and place of death at the county level for a total of 6788 SFCs. I explain my sources for the 
data and the data collection process  in detail in the Appendixv. 
 I derive my socioeconomic indicators from a county-level development study conducted by 
the State Planning Agency based on the 2000 census (Dincer and Ozaslan, 2004).  
 Finally, the data set contains an estimate of the ethnically Kurdish population percentage in 
each county. The Appendix includes a detailed explanation of how I derived these estimates. 
5. THE ANALYSES 
Note that the data exhibits a multilevel character: the students are nested within schools, which in 
turn are geographically nested within counties that are nested within provinces. The presence of 
layers may violate the standard OLS assumption of independent error terms as it is highly likely 
that the error terms for the students from the same school will be correlated due to school level 
unobserved factors, similarly error terms within a county will be correlated due to unobserved 
factors at the county level, and error terms within a province will be correlated due to unobserved 
factors at the province level. Ignoring the multilevel character of data risks erroneously low 
coefficient standard errors, and consequently, increases the risk of declaring significant effects for 
predictors which in fact have none (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). In order to account for the 
unobserved school, county and province level factors, I use the following  multilevel linear  model  
in which these factors are incorporated as random effects: 
T{s,i,j,p}= α+ γN{s,i,j,p}+ΩM{i,j,p}+βC{j,p}+φK{j,p}+γX{j,p}+ω {p}+ρ{j,p}+u{i,j,p} +ε{s,i,j,p} 
where ω {p} is the province level error component, ρ{j,p} is the county level error component, u{i,j,p} 
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is the school level error component and ε{s,i,j,p} is the individual observation level error component, 
with E(ε{s,i,j,p})=0, Var (ε{s,i,j,p}) =σ2; E(u{i,j,p})=0, Var(u{i,j,p})=τ2; E(ρj,p})=0, Var(ρ{j,p})=ς2;  
E(ω{p})=0, Var(ω{p})=ν2, and Cov [ε{s,i,j,p},u{i,j,p}]=0, Cov [ε{s,i,j,p}, ρ{j,p}]=0, Cov [ε{s,i,j,p}, ω{p}]=0, 
Cov[u{i,j,p}, ρ{j,p}]=0, Cov[u{i,j,p}, ω{p}]=0, and Cov[ρ{j,p},ω{p}]=0. 
 T{s,i,j,p} is the test score of student s from school i in county j of province p. I have three runs 
of the model with quantitative scores, Turkish-math (TM) scores, and verbal scores as the 
dependent variable.  
 N{s,i,j,p} is a vector of student characteristics including gender (a dummy variable that takes 
on the value 1 for female students, and 0 for male students), and dummy variables indicating the 
student’s major in highschool.  
 M{i,j,p} is a vector of dummy variables indicating the type of the highschool that student s is 
graduating or has graduated from. There are 12 types of highschoolsvi leading to 11 dummy 
variables with vocational schools being the omitted type.  
 C{j,p} is the number of SFCs in county j of province p and in counties neighboring j in the 
1990-2005 periodvii. Note that the data set is restricted to those students who had recently graduated 
or were about to gradute from highschool. While it is possible that this group includes students who 
had repeated grades, it is safe to argue that, on the average, these students were born around 1987, 
and started primary school around 1993. Because violence is likely to have a lagged effect, and 
because the data may include kids who had repeated grades (or had started school at a younger age) 
I use the number of  SFCs in the 1990-2005 period rather than  the 1993-2005 periodviii.  
 I have several reasons to argue that the number of SFCs provide a good measure of conflict 
intensity in a locality. First of all, even though the number of SFCs does not correspond to the total 
number of casualties, which is a commonly used measure of conflict intensity in the literature, one 
can expect a high correlation between the two. In fact, the yearly aggregates I have for the number 
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of SFCs is 84% correlated with the yearly total casualties and 98% correlated with the yearly total 
number of PKK attacks reported by the Turkish General Staff (Şener, 2010). The correlation 
between the yearly total casualty numbers reported by the Federation of American Scientists 
(www.fas.org) and the yearly aggregates of SFCs in my database is even higher at 96%, while the 
correlation between SFCs and other casualties (civilians, insurgents and village guards) is 95%. 
Also, as the correlation between the number of SFCs and PKK attacks clearly demonstrate, SCFs in 
a county is a good measure of the PKK presence in the area. The presence of PKK insurgents and 
activity in an area cause a great deal of inconvenience for the civilian residents.  Not only it means 
that they can get caught in crossfire, or become a landmine victim, it also means that their daily 
lives are disturbed by the heightened security measures like the increased number of security 
personnel in the area, and the frequent security checks and controls that are imposed on the 
civilians, and also by the frequent interruption of normal day-to-day life as a result of attacks and 
armed skirmishes between security forces and the PKK. In many cases it also means that they will 
be pressured, threatened or even killed by PKK militants searching for hide-outs, shelters, supplies 
or political support. Thus, I argue that SFCs provide a good measure of the level of conflict 
civilians are exposed to. 
 K{j,p} is the percentage of ethnically Kurdish population in county j of province p in year 
2000. I expect ethnic distribution to affect test scores because the language of education in primary 
schools is Turkish and many ethnically Kurdish kids start their education with either poor or no 
knowledge of the Turkish language. This linguistic disadvantage is likely to have a negative impact 
on the educational achievement of ethnically Kurdish students. Unfortunately, I do not have 
information on ethnic background at the student level. Consequently, I can not study the association 
between the ethnic background of students and their educational achievement. Nevertheless, I 
control for the Kurdish percentage of the population at the county level which allows me to study 
the association between the ethnic composition of localities and educational success. 
 X{j,p} is a vector of socioeconomic, and demographic control variables at the county level for 
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the year 2000. I control for unemployment rate, share of agricultural employment, and population 
growth rate. Unemployment rate is included to control for the general economic conditions across 
counties. Share of agricultural employment is expected to affect student performance since in 
agricultural localities kids tend to spend time working in the family farm. Moreover, agricultural 
employment is a good indicator of the level of development in a county. Population growth rate is 
included to control for migration flows which reflect the economic attractiveness of counties. I also 
include a dummy variable indicating whether the county is a provincial center (city) which is 
usually the most developed county of a province.    
 Table 1 below presents the mean values of variables for counties with and without SFCs. As 
can be seen the average test score is higher in counties with no SFCs for all score types. The 
difference is around 1.5 points. As I will discuss in the next section, due to excess demand for 
university education and the resulting competitiveness of the system, a 1.5-point difference 
corresponds to thousands in rankings, and thus, is quite substantial.  
 The average percentage of Kurdish population is higher in the counties within the conflict 
zone. These counties are also economically backward, with higher shares of agricultural sector, and 
higher levels of unemployment. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
(C) gives the mean value for counties with SFCs in the 1990-2005 period. 
(NC) gives the mean value for counties with no SFC in the same period. 
Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
Number of counties 
 
C: 
NC: 
382 
529 
Number of schools 
 
C: 
NC: 
3055 
5075 
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Number of students 
 
C: 
NC: 
594,179 
759,160 
Quantitative score in the 2005 OSS C: 
NC: 
156.1 (44.5) 
157.7 (45.4) 
TM score in the 2005 OSS C: 
NC: 
172.1 (46.7) 
173.5 (47.1) 
 
Verbal score in the 2005 OSS C: 
NC: 
182.1 (50.6) 
183.4 (50.3) 
 
SFCs in the 1990-2005 period 
 
C: 
NC: 
86.54 (185.18) 
0 (0) 
 
Percentage of Kurdish population  C: 
NC: 
26.17 (26.75) 
3.15 (2.90) 
 
Population growth rate (%) C: 
NC: 
0.49 (2.70) 
2.94 (12.19) 
 
Share of agricultural employment (%) C: 
NC: 
71.26 (18.38) 
62.20 (23.67) 
 
Unemployment rate (%) C: 
NC: 
7.23 (4.76) 
6.26 (4.04) 
 
 
 
6. RESULTS 
 I estimate my model using the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation 
technique. REML and unrestricted/full maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) produce identical 
fixed effects estimates. Their estimates for variance components will also be the same for large 
samples, but because REML corrects for the degrees of freedom consumed by estimation of the 
fixed effects, for small samples, MLE is biased toward lower variance estimates (Steenberger and 
Jones, 2002; Albright and Marinova, 2010). 
 Table 2 below presents the results of the regression analyses testing the association between 
the armed conflict and the 2005 OSS scores of students. The columns present the results for 
models where the quantitative, TM, and verbal test scores are the dependent variable respectively.  
TABLE 2: Effects of the Armed Conflict on the 2005 University Entrance Exam Scores 
 Dependent variable:  
Quantitative score  
Dependent variable: 
Turkish-Math score  
Dependent variable: 
Social sciences score  
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Results from the mixed effects REML regression 
Number of obs.:480655 
Number of schools:6979 
Number of counties: 887 
Number of provinces:81 
 
Number of obs.:645772 
Number of schools:6873 
Number of counties: 908 
Number of provinces:81 
Number of obs.:347480 
Number of schools:6755 
Number of counties: 909 
Number of provinces:81 
Constant 
105.16*** 
(5.74) 
 
135.81***                                
(1.83) 
167.86***                              
(2.16) 
SFCs in the 1990-2005 period -0.013*** 
(0.005) 
 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.005)  
Gender -4.43*** 
(0.14) 
 
2.82*** 
(0.10) 
4.87*** 
(0.17) 
Science major 
 
41.58*** 
(5.34) 
 
36.03*** 
(0.72) 
-0.88 
(1.07) 
Turkish-math major 
 
25.80*** 
(5.37) 
 
12.37*** 
(0.70) 
20.31*** 
(0.89) 
Social sciences major 31.08*** 
(5.40) 
 
13.21*** 
(0.76) 
-10.18*** 
(0.89) 
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population -0.03 
(0.03) 
 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.03)  
 
Population growth rate 0.035 
(0.19) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
   0.02 
 (0.02) 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
  -0.02 
  (0.1) 
 
Share of agricultural employment -0.20*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
      -0.12*** 
   (0.02) 
 
Provincial center 5.06*** 
 (0.90) 
3.66*** 
 (0.75) 
   4.18*** 
   (0.86) 
School type dummies (excluded type: vocational highschool):   
Anatolian highschool 96.05***(1.06) 72.87***(0.92) 61.16***(1.16) 
Science highschool 127.5***(2.74) 97.03***(3.32) 61.95**(27.60) 
Private highschool 61.82***(1.22) 44.39***(1.02) 30.37***(1.38) 
Private science highschool 93.22***(2.72) 60.87***(2.87) 35.45** (18.07) 
Evening highschool -6.82(6.75) -5.59 (4.41) -16.59***(3.37) 
Military highschool 25.11*** (4.80) 30.14*** (5.71) -0.50 (11.42) 
Teacher training highschool 93.23***(2.05) 67.67***(1.78) 50.83***(1.84) 
Art highschool 47.52 (46.16) 23.22***(2.42) 25.52***(3.53) 
Religious highschool 53.95***(2.10) 42.56***(1.24) 31.71***(0.97) 
Regular public highschool 47.73*** (0.62) 38.40***(0.57) 29.96***(0.69) 
Multiple program public highschool 16.68***(0.98) 
 
16.30***(0.82) 
 
16.41***(0.99) 
 
Random Effects (standard deviations)    
Province level (ν) 
                                                                                         
County level (ς) 
                                                                                       
School level (τ) 
 
Student level (σ) 
3.35 
                                  
 1.08 
 
18.91 
 
42.07 
2.51 
                                 
0.51 
 
15.57 
 
36.80 
3.33 
                                 
1.14 
 
15.29 
 
45.23 
***:significant at 1% level;  **:significant at 5% level;  *:significant at 10% level. 
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 For all score types the estimated coefficients for SFCs are negative and highly significant. 
Each additional SFC, on the average, is associated with a 0.013, 0.014, and 0.023 points decrease 
in the quantitative, TM, and verbal scores respectively. Considering that the average number of 
SFCs in the 312 counties that has more than a single casualty in the 1990-2005 period is 105, and 
that there are 84 counties with more than 100 casualties, 15 with more than 500, and 3 with more 
than 1000, these results demonstrate how substantial the association between  the PKK insurgency 
and the educational acheivement of students in the conflict zone is. For example, the quantitative 
score of a student from Sirnak, a county with 1210 SFCs in the 1990-2005 period, is on the 
average expected to be 16 points less than the score of a student with similar characteristics from a 
county with similar socioeconomic conditions but outside the conflict zone with no SFCs. A 
difference of 16 points corresponds to about 55 thousand students in quantitative scores ranking. 
The expected difference in verbal scores is even more pronounced at 28 points which corresponds 
to about 76 thousand students in verbal ranking. Note that because of excess demand for university 
education (each year only about one third of students who take the entrance exam are able to enroll 
in a university program) entrance is very competitive. University programs, on average, accept 
about 50 students each year, and as a result of the high demand, the difference between the score 
of the most succesful student they can attract and the lowest score they accept is usually only about 
4 or 5 points. 
  The plots in Table 3 below visualize these results for a better grasp of the association 
between the conflict and the students’ performance. The plots in the first row show respectively 
the densities of expected quantitative, TM, and verbal scores of a student from a public highschool 
who majored in science under two casualty scenarios. For each type of score the bell shaped curve 
on the left is the density of expected test score in a county with 105 SFCs, which is the mean value 
of SFCs in counties with more than a single casualty in the 1990-2005 period, and with mean 
values of unemployment rate, share of agricultural employment, population growth rate, and 
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percentage of ethnically Kurdish population, while the curve to the right plots the density of 
expected test score when the number of SFCs is zero holding everything else constant.   
  As these plots demonstrate, expected test scores are significantly higher in counties with no 
casualties. The means of the distributions of expected quantitative, TM and verbal test scores when 
the number of SFCs is set at its average value is statistically significantly lower than the means of 
the distribution of expected scores when the number of SFCs is set at zero. The fact that these 
differences correspond to about 7000 students in quantitative ranking, 14000 students in TM 
ranking, and 11000 students in verbal ranking is telling in terms of the detrimental impact of the 
conflict on the educational achievement of the students from the conflict zone.   
 The plots in the second row depict the simulation exercise when the number of SFCs is set 
at one standard deviation above the mean. Note that there are 32 counties with a higher number of 
SFCs. The magnitude of the negative association between the conflict and educational success is 
again clear. 
Table 3 : Densities of expected test scores 
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 I have also examined the predictive performance of my model by conducting two-fold cross-
validation tests. I have randomly set aside 1% of the observations, and fit the model on the 
remaining 99%. Then I used the observations I had excluded as a test-bed to see how accurately my 
model can predict them. Chart A1 in the Appendix depicts the results for quantitative, TM, and 
verbal test scores respectively. Evidently the model has a tendency to overestimate the scores of 
students who got zero points, nevertheless, the fit is much better for those who were more 
successful. 
 Finally, I conducted a robustness check and reestimated the model excluding students from 
counties within the metropolitan municipalities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, the three most 
developed provinces in Turkey. These counties are “outliers in terms of socio-economic 
development” (Dincer and Ozaslan, 2004), and they have the best schools in the country. Moreover, 
they are all far from the conflict zone, and consequently have zero SFCs within the 1990-2005 
period.  Table A1 in the Appendix presents the results when students from these developmental 
outliers are excluded from the data set to make sure that the results are not driven by them. As can 
be seen the negative association between the conflict and test scores is robust to the exclusion of 
developmentally outlier counties.   
 One interesting question that remains is whether the association between the conflict and test 
scores varies by genderix. Note that the results in Table 2 reveal a clear gender gap in test scores. 
While male students are, on the average, more successful in the quantitative test, female students do 
better in the TM and social sciences tests. These gaps are not very surprising given that the majority 
of research on gender differences in school performance has highlighted boys’ advantage on 
standardized math tests, and girls’ advantage in standardized reading tests. Similar gaps have been 
commonly observed in other standardized tests across countries, like the Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), the SAT in the United States, and the National Program for Literacy 
and Numeracy (NAPLAN)  in Australia (Heilbronner, 2013; Kim and Law, 2012; Forgasz and Hill, 
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2013; Downey and Yuan, 2005). Researchers argue that the female disadvantage in maths arises 
mainly from gender differences in career preferences, lifestyle choices, and activities outside the 
classroom; and from gender stereotypes and discrimination (Ceci and Williams, 2010; Downey and 
Yuan, 2005; Gunderson et al., 2012).  Gunderson et al. (2012) argue that parents’ and teachers’ 
expectancies for children’s math competence are often gender-biased, and they can influence 
children’s math attitudes and performance. And children’s math attitudes and performance are 
powerful determinants of their subsequent behaviors which then come back to influence the very 
social outcomes, like gender stereotypes, gender roles, and women’s underrepresentation in math-
intensive fields that are responsible for the gender gap in math achievement in the first place 
(Cheryan, 2012).  
 A gender differentiation in the association between civil conflicts and educational achievement 
indicates that civil conflicts have direct implications for gender gaps in educational achievement. In 
order to test whether such a differentiation exists, I reestimated my model with the inclusion of an 
interaction variable between gender and the number of SFCs. Table 4 below presents the results, 
which indicate that the conflict has a significantly more detrimental impact on the quantitative test 
scores of female students compared to males studentsx. A similar, albeit small differential impact is 
observed upon Turkish-math scores as well. However, we do not observe any gender differentiation 
for the impact of the conflict on social sciences test scores. It seems the conflict worsens the female 
disadvantage in math and math-intensive fields.  
TABLE 4: Differential Effects of the Armed Conflict on theTest Scores of Male and Female Students 
 Dependent variable:  
Quantitative score  
Dependent variable: 
Turkish-Math score  
Dependent variable: 
Social sciences score  
Results from the mixed effects REML regression 
Number of obs.:480655 
Number of schools:6979 
Number of counties: 887 
Number of provinces:81 
 
Number of obs.:645772 
Number of schools:6873 
Number of counties: 908 
Number of provinces:81 
Number of obs.:347480 
Number of schools:6755 
Number of counties: 909 
Number of provinces:81 
Constant 
105.03*** 
(5.73) 
 
135.75*** 
(1.83) 
 
167.87***                             
(2.16) 
Gender -4.05*** 
(0.14) 
 
2.89*** 
(0.10) 
 
4.85*** 
(0.18) 
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SFCs in the 1990-2005 period -0.008* 
(0.005) 
 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.024*** 
(0.005)  
Gender*SFCs in the 1990-2005 period -0.023*** 
(0.002) 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.001 
(0.002)  
Science major 
 
41.53*** 
(5.34) 
 
36.04*** 
(0.72) 
 
-0.88 
(1.07) 
Turkish-math major 
 
25.73*** 
(5.38) 
 
12.37*** 
(0.70) 
 
20.31*** 
(0.89) 
Social sciences major  30.95*** 
(5.40) 
 
13.21*** 
(0.76) 
-10.17*** 
(0.89) 
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population -0.03 
(0.03) 
 
-0.05** 
(0.03) 
 
0.001 
(0.03)  
 
Population growth rate 0.035* 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
   0.02 
 (0.02) 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.15*** 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
  -0.015 
  (0.10) 
 
Share of agricultural employment -0.20*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
      -0.11*** 
   (0.02) 
 
Provincial center 5.09*** 
 (0.90) 
 
3.67*** 
 (0.75) 
   4.18*** 
   (0.86) 
Estimated coefficients for  school type dummies are not reported.   
Random Effects (standard deviations)    
Province level (ν) 
 
County level (ς) 
                                                                                       
School level (τ) 
 
Student level (σ) 
 
3.353                                 
 
1.08 
 
18.91 
 
42.07 
2.51                                 
 
0.52 
 
15.57 
 
36.80 
 
3.33                            
 
1.14 
 
15.28 
 
45.22 
***:significant at 1% level;  **:significant at 5% level;  *:significant at 10% level. 
 
 A possible explanation for this observed gender differentiation is that those factors that create the 
gender gap in math achievement in the first place might also make it more difficult for girls to make 
up for the math and science classes they miss due to disruptions caused by the conflict. Gender 
biases and stereotypes their parents and teachers may have might lead these girls to get less help in 
math-intensive subjects. Also boys are more likely to be involved in outside activities that can 
improve their math skills, like helping with the family business, or having a part time clerical job, 
whereas girls are often confined to helping their mothers with house-chores. 
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 The gender differentiation in the association between the conflict and math-intensive test scores 
highlight another long term influence civil conflicts exert on host societies. It seems by 
disadvantaging female students even more in math and science achievement, civil conflicts foster 
gender biases,  and traditional gender roles in these societies. This is a novel finding, and it points to 
an important dynamic that future studies should look into. For the Turkish case, it can be argued 
that the conflict, by further disadvantaging female highschool students in math achievement, 
reenforces the gender biases and roles in a society that already suffers severely from gender 
discrimination against womenxi.  
 Another important question is whether the negative association between the conflict and 
educational achievement varies by the timing of exposure to violence. Understanding when the 
most serious “damage” on educational achievement is done is very important for understanding 
both the public health and educational effects of civil conflicts, for figuring out the dynamics 
behind these effects, and for devising policies to deal with those mechanisms. A substantial impact 
of violence in early childhood, for example, indicates that psychological and developmental 
mechanisms might be playing a leading role. In her 2002 study McDonald presents a striking 
example of these mechanisms. She argues that neglect in early childhood, which is very common in 
conflict environments, inhibits brain development in children. Similarly, Briggs-Gowan et al. 
(2010) present evidence that violence exposure in early childhood is associated with depression, 
separation anxiety, post-traumatic stress, and conduct problems in children. There are also studies 
which show that even being exposed to violent media in early childhood leads to adverse mental 
health effects and lower academic achievement (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012; Gentile et al., 2011). On 
the other hand, if it is violence during adolescence that has the most impact on educational 
achievement, then changes in the school and social environment should also be given priority as 
possible mechanisms alongside psychological ones.   
 Unfortunately, the available data does not allow me to explore the impact of the timing of 
exposure to conflict. Because I only have the 2005 test results, I am able to observe a single age 
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cohort of students. Consequently, I am not able to control for cohort effectsxii. This important 
question remains open for future studies. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This study analyzes the effects of the ongoing civil conflict in Turkey on educational 
achievement by studying the results of  the 2005 university entrance exam. The results demonstrate 
a significant negative association between the conflict and the test scores of students. Students from 
the conflict zone fall significantly behind in the race. The negative impact of the conflict amount to 
a drop of thousands in rankings for these kids, which prevents many of them from having a 
university education. Coupled with high levels of unemployment, and low levels of economic 
opportunity in their hometowns, such a dismissal from the education system leaves these kids 
without much hope for the future, and creates a fertile recruitment ground for further violence and 
conflict. Even for those students who make the cut and manage to enroll in some university 
program, it is highly likely that it will not be a high ranked one. With the adverse effects of the 
conflict weighing their educational success down, it is very difficult (if not impossible) for students 
from the conflict zone to make it to the top universities of the country.  
Performance of students on standardized tests is a direct measure of a country’s human 
capital, something that might be called “the average level of cognitive skills among those entering 
the work force” (Hanushek, 2008).  The results in this study reveal that the conflict is severely 
hurting the cognitive skills of students in the conflict zone. Combining these results with the already 
established link in the literature between education and socioeconomic well-being of societies, I 
argue that education is a major channel through which civil conflicts exert their long-term 
detrimental impacts on host societies.  
Understanding the mechanisms by which civil conflict affects education is important in 
formulating effective policies to counteract these effects. My analysis empirically demonstrates the 
existence of a negative association between the civil conflict and educational achievement in 
Turkey, but does not address the mechanisms behind this association. Nevertheless, the recent 
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history of the country provides us with some insights. Early in the 90s, the PKK burned down some 
238 schools in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. Moreover, due to security concerns more than 
2000 village schools were closed down in the areaxiii and their students were transfered to schools in 
nearby villages. Thus, the destruction of infrastructure is likely to be one mechanism through which 
the conflict hurt education. But, the damage is not limited to the schools that ceased to exist and to 
the students of these schools. The conflict also damaged the attractiveness of these areas by 
dampening social and economic life, and by creating security concerns for their inhabitants. Such 
concerns were  especially heightened by PKK attacks on public employees, including teachers.  In 
the early 90s the PKK killed 136 primary and highschool teachers in eastern and southeastern 
provinces. Consequently, it became difficult for the schools in the conflict zone to attract and keep 
skilled, experienced teachers, and to run regular class schedules. A parliamentary inquiry in 2012 
about the shortage of teachers in eastern and southeastern Turkey reveals the magnitude of this 
difficulty: Between 2003 and 2008, of the 5129 teachers who were appointed to public schools in 
Sirnak (the province with the highest number of SFCs in the 1990-2005 period) by the Ministry of 
Education, 4605 resigned. In other words, almost 90% of them refused to work in Sirnak (Guclu, 
2010). Similarly, in 1997, the governor of the martial law zone was complaining that at least half of 
the 10 thousand teachers appointed to the area had not shown up for their posts (Sabah daily 
newspaper, October 30, 1997). A columnist in a local Hakkari newspaper explains how offended he 
was in seeing young teachers crying upon learning that they were appointed to Hakkari: “Those of 
you who accept the appointment and come to our town do so unwillingly. Your unwillingness 
reflect in your performance in class, and take away your productivity. This is why our kids always 
rank bottom in all centralized exams.”(Tas, 2011). Hakkari is a province at the southeast corner of 
Turkey, bordering Iraq, with the second highest number of SFCs after Sirnak in the 1990-2005 
period. A recent interview conducted in Hakkari with highschool students who actually scored zero 
points in the 2012 university entrance exam clearly reveals that students also blame the lack of 
experienced, skilled teachers for their failure: “A major problem is that teachers do not stay in 
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Hakkari. I do not remember my primary school teacher because I had seven different teachers from 
grade one to grade five...”; “All the teachers (in my school) were new graduates, and they all 
wanted to leave this place as soon as possible...”; “There is a world of difference between the east 
and the west in this country. Here sometimes teachers do not come to class for two-three months...” 
(T24, April 30, 2012). 
  Evidently, the lack of skilled and experienced teachers, and high teacher absence and 
turnover rates are important mechanisms through which the conflict hurt education. Teacher quality 
is argued in the literature to be the most important determinant of educational quality. (Hanushek, 
2002; Hanushek, 2011). The magnitude of estimated differences in student achievement due to 
teacher quality is impressive. Hanushek (1992) shows that teachers near the top of the quality 
distribution can get an entire year’s worth of additional learning out of their students compared to 
those near the bottom (for a detailed review of the literature on teacher quality see Hanushek and 
Rivkin (2006)). And not surprisingly teacher absence is also detrimental for student success. Duflo 
and Hanna (2005), show that a randomized intervention that reduced teacher absence from 42 to 22 
percent led to a 0.17 standard deviation improvement in student test scores. A high turnover rate, 
because it does not allow students to bond with their teachers, is also expected to impact 
educational quality negatively. 
 One can also argue that the disruptions in daily life in the conflict zone reflects negatively on 
education. Curfews, restrictions on travel, check points, and other security measures imposed by the 
authorities in such environemtns may disrupt regular schooling. 
Finally, the economic, physical, and psychological damages suffered by parents, students, 
and teachers in the conflict zone are likely to impact negatively on education.  
In order to devise appropriate measures to remedy the negative impact of civil conflicts on 
education, we need a complete understanding of all such possible mechanisms and their relative 
importance. This remains as an important task for future research.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                               
i The red areas have more than 500 SFCs; the purple areas have 250 to 500; the pink areas have 100 to 250; the blue 
areas have 50 to 100; the green areas have 20 to 50; the orange areas have 10 to 20; the yellow areas have 1 to 10; and 
gray areas have no SFCs. 
ii This information is provided in the original data set. 
iii Primary schooling, which is grade 1 through grade 8, is mandatory in Turkey. Turkish children start primary school at 
age six. Students then continue on to high school from which they are expected to graduate in 4 years. 
iv Note that those excluded are distributed randomly over the country. 
v The Appendix is available online at http://jcr.sagepub.com/. 
vi The types are regular public highschools, private highschools, evening highschools, public anatolian highschools 
which give education in English, public science highschools, private science highschools, military highschools, teacher 
highschools, art highschools, religious highschools, multiple program public highschools, and vocational schools. 
vii Neighboring counties of county j are those bordering j. 
viii Neither using the 1993-2005 period nor extending the period to 1987-2005 to cover for longer lags in the effects of 
violence create any substantial change in the results, except for  small scale effects. Results are available upon request. 
ix I thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this question to my attention. 
x At first look it seems the conflict does not really affect male students’ quantitative scores much. Nevertheless,  I 
reestimated the model for male and female students separately. The results are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
As the results demonstrate violence has a significant negative impact on the quantitative scores of both male and female 
students.  
xi Turkey ranks 124th among the 135 countries in the 2012 Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum. 
xii Another way to explore the impact of timing of exposure to violence would be to include the number of SFCs in 
different time periods simultaneously as separate controls in the model. But, because the conflict in Turkey has always 
been geographically concentrated, casualty series for different periods are very highly correlated. Consequently, having 
such highly correlated controls in the model leads to severe multicollinearity, and renders the coefficient estimates 
insignificant and unreliable. 
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xiii According to a formal answer given by the minister of education to a parliamentary questioning conducted on 22 
March, 1994, by then the conflict had led to the closure of 2181 schools in eastern and southeastern Turkey (Turkish 
Grand National Assembly archives, meeting minutes, March 22, 1994). 
